Perhaps it’s not all that widely appreciated that many philosophers have serious problems with lying. For it seems that despite the rampant ubiquity of lying, there isn’t as yet a general agreement amongst philosophers as to exactly what it is. As the authors of a new paper in the journal Philosophical Psychology point out : “… a number of philosophers have proposed several different and incompatible definitions of lying.” Perhaps what’s needed is an empirical investigation into the concept of lying – and just such an undertaking has been undertaken by Dr. Adam J. Arico and professor Don T. Fallis from the University of Arizona, US. It’s entitled: ‘Lies, damned lies, and statistics: An empirical investigation of the concept of lying’. Their two-part experimental study involved the participation of more than 200 students from the university, who were exposed to vignette scenarios of truth and lies. Thus, the implications of bald-faced lies, proviso lies, straight-forward lies, and confused lies were examined. But, disappointingly perhaps for those who were expecting a new watertight definition, the study doesn’t go so far as to provide one – noting that further empirical studies are needed before that becomes, from a philosophical point of view, a reality.
